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Abstract
Background: The enactment of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will impact on European data science. Particular
concerns relating to consent requirements that would severely restrict medical data research have been raised.
Objective: Our objective is to explain the changes in data protection laws that apply to medical research and to discuss their
potential impact.
Methods: Analysis of ethicolegal requirements imposed by the GDPR.
Results: The GDPR makes the classification of pseudonymised data as personal data clearer, although it has not been entirely
resolved. Biomedical research on personal data where consent has not been obtained must be of substantial public interest.
Conclusions: The GDPR introduces protections for data subjects that aim for consistency across the EU. The proposed changes
will make little impact on biomedical data research.
(J Med Internet Res 2017;19(2):e47)   doi:10.2196/jmir.7108
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Overview
There have been significant developments in European Union
(EU) data protection law recently that will have an impact on
health care professionals, particularly those engaged in research
and audit. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has
replaced the current legislation and comes into full effect in
2018 [1]. The implications for the handling of health care data
of the GDPR will be discussed in this paper. Despite the recent
referendum vote in the United Kingdom to leave the EU, the
GDPR will continue to be relevant to the United Kingdom,
whether this is due to cooperation in European projects or
because the United Kingdom continues to be a member of the
European Economic Area (EEA).
The Data Protection Directive
Currently the relevant law in the United Kingdom is the Data
Protection Act 1998, which is the United Kingdom’s
transposition of the Data Protection Directive (DPD). European
directives are not directly enforceable, requiring member states
to pass legislation to comply with their requirements. There are
derogations (legal exemptions) for research, which in the case
of the United Kingdom have been criticized for being too broad.
The Local and Regional Development Planning Kantor report
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for the European Commission criticizes the United Kingdom
for disregard of the limitations, stating that the Data Protection
Act blatantly violates the Directive by adding “medical research”
to the list of medical purposes [2]. The DPD requires a
“substantial public interest” for member states to add to the
derogations for processing of sensitive personal data (Article
8.4).
Differences between EU member states can result in research
ethics committees in United Kingdom denying permission for
National Health Service (NHS) data to be transferred to other
EU countries (the opposite might also be the case in some
circumstances) [3]. These differences have also contributed to
the passage of the GDPR as part of the Digital Single Market
strategy [4].
The Law as It Will Be From 2018: The
General Data Protection Regulation
The text of the GDPR has recently been agreed after a prolonged
trilogue between the European Commission, Parliament, and
the Council of Ministers [5]. This legislation will replace the
national transpositions of the DPD. Regulations are directly
enforceable across the EU. The GDPR comes into full effect
on May 25, 2018, although member states are permitted minor
differences in interpretation (the European Court of Justice is
the ultimate arbiter). This legislation has the potential to affect
projects using research data banks and Big Data [6,7]. There
had been concerns that a clause inserted by the European
Parliament requiring specific consent would prevent significant
long-term epidemiological research taking place in the future
[8], but this was rejected and the agreed text permits broad
consent to “certain areas of research when in keeping with
recognized ethical standards” (Recital 33) [9]. Broad consent
is not blanket or open consent [10] although some commentators
argue that blanket or open consent is acceptable for biobank
and databank research as the risks are minimal and do not vary
for different projects [11]. Another possibility is consent to a
form of governance [12]. Open consent without any ongoing
regulation or communication about proposed projects would be
potentially problematic. Dynamic consent offers advantages for
an engaged community of participants but might not be
considered beneficial by some individuals [13].
The derogations for research without consent have been
expanded to specifically include medical research where “in the
public interest” (Recital 51). How public interest will be defined
has not been elaborated, but European jurisprudence demands
member states satisfy a high threshold where human rights are
involved (eg, a “pressing social need” [14]). This standard would
not be required for the conduct of medical research using
databanks, but it might exclude all commercial research for “me
too” drug development (drugs that offer no advantages over
drugs already on the market), arrangements that have no
evidence of benefit sharing, or simply require that projects
address issues of public importance regardless of the profits
made [15]. This requirement reflects public attitudes in the
United Kingdom to the use of health care data, where there is
resistance to use of public data for commercial ventures unless
the research could not happen without commercial involvement
[16,17].
Anonymization
Data protection law only applies to personal data—that is, data
that does directly or can indirectly identify an individual [18-20].
The simple deletion of name and address is usually insufficient
to constitute anonymization (it has been demonstrated that the
combination of 3 pieces of data could identify 87% of US
residents: 5-digit zip code, birth date, and sex) [21]. The United
Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office currently treats
pseudonymized data as anonymous where it is used by a third
party who does not possess the requisite key code. Truly
anonymized data cannot be linked back to an individual (which
means that verification of data is not possible by any means).
Pseudonymized data typically has identifiers removed and
replaced with a unique key code (there is also 2-way
cryptography; 1-way cryptography is considered anonymized).
This key code can be used to trace the data back to an individual,
enabling any safety concerns to be acted upon and for data to
be verified. This is the approach that the United Kingdom
Care.data project on the use of NHS electronic health records
for data research has been taking [22]. The GDPR will require
changes in practice, as it confirms in Recital 26 that
pseudonymized data must be treated as personal data (in line
with the previous Article 29 Working Party opinion) [18]. That
position results from the increased vulnerability of data subjects
who could potentially be identified compared to the protection
afforded them with true anonymisation—if the key code is
hacked, then all the data can be linked to an individual once
more.
Consent
Consent presumed by failure to opt-out, or change preticked
boxes, will no longer be permitted (unless covered by the
derogations)—consent will need to be by a “clear, affirmative
action” (Article 4.11). These changes would have arguably made
the abandoned Care.data project [23] illegal, despite the passage
of enabling legislation that exempted general practitioners from
the common law duty of confidentiality when fulfilling their
contractual duties to pass on health care data. Care.data relied
on an opt-out for legitimacy [22]. The exercise of this opt-out
was not straightforward. The numbers opting out far exceeded
the estimates and the capacity for the Health and Social Care
Information Centre (now NHS Digital) to process in a timely
manner. The problems included omission of those who opted
out from calls for NHS screening programs, even though this
was not the intention of those exercising this right. NHS Digital
currently relies on pseudonymization, which the GDPR states
is categorized as a matter of law as personal data. It is not
entirely clear whether or not third parties without access to the
key code could treat pseudonymized data as anonymized (as is
currently the case in the United Kingdom). Key codes are a
potential vulnerability due to accidental or malicious disclosure,
which is one of the justifications for pseudonymized data being
classified as personal data. There are no clear indications that
there are no future plans to use NHS patient data for research.
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Dame Fiona Caldicott reviewed arrangements because of the
widespread concerns related to consent [22], and her report led
to the cancellation of the Care.data project [23]. The particular
issues that were identified include the lack of information about
Care.data that made exercising an opt-out an opaque process,
the inadequate mechanisms for opting, and the failure of
protection for rights and access to the NHS for those who opt
out.
The risk of re-identification in the future is impossible to
quantify precisely because it cannot be predicted what
information will become public [24]. However, as with
biobanks, the risks to individuals are lesser compared with
studies of medical interventions [25]. Therefore authorization
by research ethics committees is acceptable practice, with the
requirement that opt-outs be respected unless there are
exceptional circumstances.
Although the GDPR comes into force in mid-2018, researchers
need to prepare now for the changes it will bring to long-term
epidemiological studies. In particular, the categorization of
pseudonymized data as personal will require action in some
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Greece [26]. The
necessary accommodations will require an investment of
resources, but this will hopefully ensure that subjects continue
to have trust in the integrity of their health care data and the
medical research community [27]. The GDPR may still apply
should the United Kingdom cease to become a member state of
the EU either because the United Kingdom is a member of the
EEA or because the United Kingdom retains these instruments
as law at least for the short term [28].
Although audit and research are treated differently in law, the
boundaries between the 2 activities are blurred [29]. Audit is
directly relevant to the monitoring and improvement of quality
of health care; therefore, it is included as a primary use of
data—Recitals 52-54 and Article 9.2 (h) and (i) of the GDPR
make this clear. Audit and health care management are a primary
use of health care data, and research is a secondary use—that
is, it is a use different from the originally declared purpose
(although it is designated a compatible purpose within the GDPR
but only for nonsensitive data). If an audit compares health care
systems to discover which is most effective, this can also be
categorized as research as the practices are not compared to a
gold standard, and there is a hypothesis being generated or even
tested by finding associations. The recent furor surrounding the
Royal Free Trust project in conjunction with Google DeepMind
illustrates the debate over the distinction of audit from research
[30-32].
Data Sharing
Dame Fiona Caldicott affirmed in her 2013 report on
information governance that “The duty to share can be as
important as the duty to protect patient confidentiality” [33].
Data sharing within the EU should not be obstructed because
of differences in data protection law under the principles of the
Digital Single Market and Article 1(2) of the Data Protection
Directive. Data portability and data sharing is an issue with
health care data [34], which the European Patients Smart Open
Services (epSOS) project attempted to address [35]. The GDPR
addresses data portability under Article 20, stating that the data
subject has the right to receive their data in an appropriate format
without hindrance and for data to be transferred between data
controllers where technically feasible. The Bundestag is
currently considering an eHealth bill with the same aim of
improving portability of data [36]. This will facilitate the ability
of patients to move between health care providers without
unnecessary duplication of tests.
Conclusions
The Digital Single Market aims for improved data sharing across
the EU, which will facilitate cross-border health care and
research. Harmonization will be improved under the GDPR
with a concomitant raising of standards for some countries,
although there is still room for national differences according
to the reasonable expectations of different publics. This advance
makes cross-border projects more easily ethically justifiable
and more feasible [37]. The requirements for anonymization
have not been changed, except to clarify that pseudonymized
data must still be considered as personal data. The GDPR will
facilitate medical research, except where it is research not
considered in the public interest. In that case, more demanding
requirements for anonymization will entail either true
anonymization or consent. It is likely there will be more projects
that require either consent or authorization, since many projects
currently use pseudonymization. There is still an unresolved
issue over third parties with access to pseudonymized data.
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